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A B S T R A C T
Disruptions severely undermine the reliability of railway systems. Consequently, a lot of in-
vestments are made to improve disruption management. Much has already been written about
disruption management, often with the purpose of supporting operators in their decision making.
However, to the best of our knowledge, this literature doesn't consider the structural diﬀerences
of disruption management in diﬀerent countries. An overview of the various ways in which
disruptions are solved and conditions under which that happens could help rail infrastructure
managers and train operating companies to reconsider the ways in which they operate. This
paper takes stock of the similarities and diﬀerences in how disruptions are managed in Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Of importance is not only how these systems
work on paper, but above all what happens in practice, i.e. the habits and routines that operators
have developed for solving disruptions.
1. Motive and research question
Train service disruptions pose an important challenge to railways as a reliable mode of transport (Golightly and Dadashi, 2017).
European railway infrastructure managers (RIM) and train operating companies (TOC) have invested considerably in technology to
help operators solve disruptions. Despite the automation of certain tasks and increasingly sophisticated information systems, railway
traﬃc control remains a labour-intensive process performed by many thousands of operators working in control centres (Roets and
Christiaens, 2015). Over the last decades these operators have experienced fundamental changes to the environment in which they
operate. The introduction of market mechanisms (e.g. Council Directive 91/440/EEC), followed by regulations on a single railway
market (e.g. Directive 2012/34/EU) have eroded national railway monopolies. The most important change has been the separation
between RIMs and TOCs, and emergence of many private and semi-private or corporatized TOCs. It is therefore justiﬁed to speak of a
networked instead of an integrated system for dealing with disruptions.
In such networked systems, reliable services require more than sound technical equipment and infrastructure. The operators of
the RIM and the many TOC's still need to work closely together to provide reliable services. Interdependency becomes especially
pressing during disruption management, when operators at diﬀerent control centres have to solve the complex puzzle of rescheduling
timetables, train crews and rolling stock in a coordinated manner. Coordination between control centres can be achieved through pre-
deﬁned plans and procedures, but ad-hoc measures are often necessary due to the dynamic and uncertain conditions under which
operators work (Johansson and Hollnagel, 2007). There are many studies on railway unbundling and privatization in the academic
literature (e.g. Link, 2012 this journal), but not much attention has been paid to the eﬀects of these policies on the daily operations of
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controllers managing rail traﬃc and disruptions (See Steenhuisen and De Bruijne, 2009 for an exception to the rule). This is an
important topic, since these restructuring policies and how they have been put into practice, have greatly impacted disruption
management structures and practices in diﬀerent countries (De Bruijne and Van Eeten, 2007).
Practical experience suggests that there are major diﬀerences and similarities in how rail systems have structured disruption
management processes. A thorough literature search showed that there is currently very little research into those diﬀerences and
similarities. We therefore ask: what diﬀerent types of structures and practices of railway disruption management have been developed in
European railway systems? We will take stock of both disruption management structures and practices in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands. Since formalized plans set out in documents don't tell much about what happens in reality, our focus
will be on actual practices. We will ﬁrst discuss the main elements of the complexity of managing railway disruptions in Section 2. The
research method is discussed in Section 3. Country characteristics are presented in Section 4 and then categorized in Section 5. The
conclusions are presented in section 6.
2. Managing large complex infrastructure systems
Although restructuring policies have had a major impact on the ability of infrastructure industries to provide reliable services, not
much is known on how these networks of organizations have been organized to reliably operate these systems (Berthod et al., 2017;
De Bruijne, 2006). We start from the premise that disruptions in rail services will occur, and that their impact has to be minimized in
order to return to normal services as soon as possible. We therefore want to understand how these disruptions are managed in
diﬀerent systems and how operators coordinate their actions during the process of managing disruptions. We thus see reliability as the
ability of an organization to anticipate and contain incidents in the course of its operation (Berthod et al., 2017). This places an
emphasis on how systems manage their adaptive capacity to successfully manage disruptions (cf. Branlat and Woods, 2010; Hémond
and Robert, 2012; Mattsson and Jenelius, 2015). Complex systems have to deal with trade-oﬀs that bound their adaptive performance
(cf. Hoﬀman and Woods, 2011). In this paper, we focus on two such trade-oﬀs: (a) decentralized versus centralized structure, and (b)
anticipation versus resilience.
The occurrence of unexpected disruptions in complex systems places an emphasis on a decentralized structure, because detailed
knowledge of the local context and direct control over resources give local actors the ﬂexibility required to deal with these non-
routine situations (Perrow, 1999). However, Perrow (1999) warns against the tight-coupling of complex systems and the risk of
cascading failures. Disruptions can severely compromise the capacity of local operators to keep an overview of and control over the
situation (Schipper, 2017). As a result decisions made locally don't always contribute to the overall performance of the system. One
solution for this problem is to centralize control in order to facilitate rapid and decisive coordinated action. Centralized control,
however, is not without its diﬃculties. Decisions require that a considerable volume of information is shared between the diﬀerent
levels of control; something that is not always possible when working under stress (Branlat and Woods, 2010; Schipper, 2017).
Consequently, decisions may be perpetually lagging behind the actual local situation. It is therefore necessary to ﬁnd the right
balance between decentralized and centralized decision making.
The second trade-oﬀ concerns anticipation versus resilience (Vogus and Sutcliﬀe, 2007; Wildavsky, 1988). The anticipation
approach involves the prediction of potential failures or disruptions in order to plan ahead (Stephenson, 2010). Part of this planning
is the development of pre-deﬁned coordination mechanisms, e.g. contingency plans, rules, and procedures, that specify roles and
tasks for all operators. Pre-deﬁned coordination mechanisms reduces coordination issues between actors, subsequently increasing
responsiveness. However, it remains impossible to anticipate every situation. For instance, the type, location, and timing of an
incident will inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of the response (Golightly and Dadashi, 2017). Consequently, there needs to be discretionary
room for operators to modify plans to the speciﬁc situation through mutual adjustment and improvisation (Faraj and Xiao, 2006).
Real time adaptation can be considered a resilience1 approach that substitutes foresight for the reactive capacity of control room
operators and focuses on their expertise and tacit knowledge (Roe and Schulman, 2008). However, an improvised response still needs
to be swift and coordinated when dealing with a rapidly changing environment. Hence, anticipation and resilience are not mutually
exclusive but constitute a trade-oﬀ when developing an eﬀective response (Comfort et al., 2001).
There is not one single, optimal way of dealing with these trade-oﬀs in general; and each railway systems will balance these trade-
oﬀs in speciﬁc ways (Woods and Branlat, 2011). Yet, the extent of these trade-oﬀs in various European countries is currently un-
known. This, then, is the motive of the current research. We will categorize the diﬀerent national structures and practices of dis-
ruption management, with a focus on the trade-oﬀs discussed above. Disruption management happens within the speciﬁc context of a
country that (dis)allows for certain solutions. We will ﬁrst look at the characteristics of the diﬀerent railway systems, i.e. the length of
the rail network, the number of train operating companies, the average daily number of trains being operated, and the relationship
between the RIM and TOCs. Next, we will present the diﬀerent roles and teams involved in disruption management and the re-
lationships between them (section 4). Please note that our focus is on the rescheduling of resources (timetable, train crew, rolling
stock), i.e. we only consider operators working at the control centres, not those directly involved in the management of an incident or
emergency, e.g. emergency services or repair crew. We will then turn to the actual disruption management process itself and ca-
tegorize the countries in terms of centralization vs. decentralization, and anticipation vs. resilience (sections 5 and 6). For both trade-
1 We acknowledge that this is a simpliﬁed application of the concept of resilience, aimed at addressing the fact that disruptions fall outside the design principles of
systems and systems thus require additional adaptive capacity. For a more elaborate discussion on resilience, see e.g. Boin and van Eeten, 2013; McManus, 2008;
Stephenson, 2010; Vogus and Sutcliﬀe, 2007.
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oﬀs we have selected several items with which to categorize the countries. These items are derived from various strands of literature
and are summarized in Table 1.
3. Method
The focus on disruption management practices required observations and interviews, which were conducted during site visits to
national control rooms and regional (or decentral) control centres from September 2015 until October 2016. Site visits commonly
lasted 2 to 3 full days, most of which would be spent on observation time in the control rooms. In all cases we were granted
unrestricted access to all operations and all operators. We observed daily operations to see how operators interacted, and if and how
certain protocols, procedures etc. were followed. This included emergency meetings whenever disruptions took place. All observa-
tions were carried out by two or three researchers, each taking detailed note. These reports were compared to prevent mis-
interpretations and the omission of important details.
In addition, we interviewed operators as well as managers on location when daily operations allowed for it. The duration of these
interviews varied greatly, from 15min to 2 h. Due to their conﬁdential nature we were unable to make audio recordings. The
researchers took detailed notes during each interview. The resulting reports were then compared for the reasons mentioned above.
Forty-nine respondents were interviewed, as listed in Table 2. The Netherlands appears underrepresented in the sample, but con-
siderable data for this country has already been collected and published (cf. Schipper et al., 2015; Schipper, 2017). We also obtained
detailed presentations and written documentation on the standard operating procedures and organizational structure of each railway
system. These materials supplemented our own observation and interview reports. The research ﬁndings have been returned to the
contact persons in each country for a member-check to correct incomplete or incorrect data. All data obtained was used by the
authors to characterize and categorize the diﬀerent countries on the basis of the items in Table 1. Each item was given a score ranging
from 1 to 5. Since there is no theoretical reason to prioritize an item, we assigned equal weight to all items.
4. Country description
First, a brief overview of the core characteristics of each country is given, followed by a description of the roles and responsi-
bilities of the operators, and the relationships between the operators. Roles and communications lines have been visualized in
Figs. 1–5. Disruption management practices are discussed in Section 5. Please note that diﬀerent countries use diﬀerent terms for
Table 1
List of items and their descriptions used in order to categorize the various countries. Items are scored from 1 (centralized/anticipation) to 5 (decentralized/resilience).
Trade-oﬀ A: centralization (item score 1) vs. decentralization (item score 5)
Item Description Measurement References
Distribution of control centres This concerns the number of control centres and
the distribution across the country.
Low number and limited
distribution: 1; high number and
distribution: 5
(Golightly et al., 2013; Stanton
et al., 2001; Wilson and Norris,
2006)
Allocation of decision rights
during disruption
This concerns the issue where decisions on
alternative service plans are made: locally or
centralized
Centralized decision-making: 1;
decentralized decision-making: 5
(Branlat and Woods, 2010; Stanton
et al., 2012)
Autonomy of local control
centres
This concerns the extent to which local control
centres can make autonomous decisions on the
rescheduling of rail traﬃc
Little autonomy: 1; considerable
autonomy: 5
(Perrow, 1999; Woods and Shattuck,
2000)
Structure and lines of
communication
This concerns the information ﬂows between
the control centres and the operators that
process the information
Centralized information ﬂows: 1;
distributed ﬂows: 5
(Houghton et al., 2006; Schipper
et al., 2015)
Co-location of RIM and TOC’s This concerns the issue whether RIM and TOC’s
are located in the same control room
Co-location: 1; full separation: 5 (Goodwin et al., 2012; Jespersen-
Groth et al., 2009)
Trade-oﬀ B: Anticipation (item score 1) vs. resilience (item score 5)
Item Description Measurement References
Role of contingency plans This concerns the number of contingency plans
and how these plans are used in practice.
Strict reliance on pre-deﬁned
plans: 1; reliance on
improvisation: 5
(Chu and Oetting, 2013; Golightly
and Dadashi, 2017)
Automation of control This concerns the availability and use of
automated control that can support or replace
human control and monitoring
Emphasis on automation: 1;
manual control: 5
(Golightly et al., 2013; Stanton
et al., 2001)
Institutionalization of shared
sensemaking
This concerns the extent to which shared
sensemaking is organized and institutionalized
Organized sensemaking: 1; no
organized sensemaking: 5
(Waller and Uitdewilligen, 2008;
Merkus et al., 2016; Schipper and
Gerrits, 2017)
Use of dispatching rules This concerns the availability and use of
dispatching rules
Strict employment of dispatching
rules: 1; no dispatching rules: 5
(Corman et al., 2011; Zhang et al.,
2013)
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Table 2
Overview of respondents per country and organization, in order of meeting.
Country Function Country Function
Austria Belgium
Regional traﬃc control Innsbruck Regional leader Central traﬃc control Deputy operational planning
Executive leader Team leader operational planning
Leader traﬃc and production Manager operational planning
Manager operations Developer communication system
Regional coordinator Planner
Emergency coordinator General supervisor
Train dispatcher Kufstein Traﬃc oﬃcer
Regional traﬃc controller Wörgl Team leader Antwerp
Central traﬃc control Leader traﬃc control Regional traﬃc controller
Traﬃc and production manager Signal house Brussels Instructor
Denmark Germany
Central traﬃc control Director Banedanmark Central traﬃc control Shift leader
Manager traﬃc control Traﬃc controller West
Punctuality manager DSB Network coordinator
Director disruptions DSB Network coordinator
Duty oﬃcer Local control centre Frankfurt Coordinator Frankfurt
Monitor freight traﬃc Deputy coordinator
Duty oﬃcer DSB Emergency coordinator
Local control centre Copenhagen Manager Copenhagen Train dispatcher
Duty oﬃcer
Train dispatcher
Train dispatcher
S-train Copenhagen Duty oﬃcer Rail signaller
Rail signaller
Manager Frankfurt
DB Frankfurt region Monitor rolling stock DB
Traﬃc information DB
Coordinator DB
Netherlands
Local control centre Utrecht Team leader
Train dispatcher
Regional traﬃc controller
Regional traﬃc controller
Fig. 1. Coordination structure in Denmark.
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similar positions or roles and that it was not always possible to harmonize these terms into English. Table 3 provides an overview of
the terms used in this paper.
4.1. Denmark
4.1.1. National characteristics
The Danish railway network measures 2667 km, 2132 of which is managed by RIM Banedanmark. Banedanmark is a government
agency under the Ministry of Transport and Building. The railway network is moderately centralized with most traﬃc converging
around Copenhagen. Only the main line to Sweden and Germany and the S-train network of Copenhagen are electriﬁed. Outside of
the Copenhagen region, the network is relatively simple with mostly non-electriﬁed, single tracks. There are four cross-border
connections to neighbouring countries, one of which is by train ferry. Passenger trains make 2700 runs per day on average, adding up
Fig. 2. Coordination structure in Austria.
Fig. 3. Coordination structure in Germany.
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Fig. 4. Coordination structure in the Netherlands.
Fig. 5. Coordination structure in Belgium.
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to a total of 5.84 billion passenger kilometres per year. Most of the trains are operated by DSB, which is state-owned and works on a
for-proﬁt basis. Some smaller lines in the west of the country are operated by Arriva and oﬀer regional train services. Freight traﬃc is
relatively small in volume, with most traﬃc running between Sweden and Germany.
4.1.2. Structure and relationships between roles and teams
The main line and regional network are monitored by train dispatchers of Banedanmark working in four regional control centres
(Regional FjernstyringsCentral, RFC). Unlike other countries in this study, in Denmark only one position (train dispatcher) has been
tasked with both monitoring the safe allocation of tracks and optimizing traﬃc ﬂows in speciﬁc areas. Train dispatchers usually make
use of computers to operate signals and switches, but in some cases switches are still operated using control panels. Each regional
control centre has a duty oﬃcer who is in charge of operations and oversees the work of the train dispatchers. The duty oﬃcer also
communicates with the national control centre (Drift Centre Danmark, DCDK) during a disruption. The DCDK was established in 2006.
Banedanmark and DSB are co-located here.
DCDK's main task is to monitor long-distance traﬃc and to assume a supervisory role if disruptions occur that could potentially
impact the overall performance of the network. Banedanmark has 4 traﬃc controllers who monitor long-distance rail passenger
services in the west and east of Denmark, the Coast Line, the international services to Sweden and Germany, and freight traﬃc.
DCDK's traﬃc controllers use the same traﬃc management system as train dispatchers in the RFC. It provides them with highly
detailed information on the local situation and allows them to swiftly assess the impact of a disruption. Train dispatchers have to
explain every delay of more than 3min, which they note in the traﬃc management system. Operators in the DCDK can then simply
click on a train to see why it is delayed and assess whether it is necessary to intervene. In addition to this, there is a communication
system that allows Banedanmark's operators to provide each other with more details on a disruption using short text messages.
On the other side of the control room, just separated by monitors and facing the Banedanmark team, a team of DSB monitor their
operations. Two operators monitor the rail traﬃc and time-table deviations. There are also 8 operators who reschedule rolling stock
and train crew when needed. Both the Banedanmark and DSB teams in the DCDK have a duty oﬃcer who is in charge of the team and
oversees the operators' work. Most communication is assigned to these duty oﬃcers in order to structure the ﬂows of information.
Communication with the emergency services has also been centralized in the DCDK to avoid miscommunications.
4.2. Austria
4.2.1. National characteristics
The Austrian railway network measures almost 5000 km in length, most of which electriﬁed, and is managed by ÖBB-
Infrastruktur. A considerable chunk of the infrastructure is concentrated in and around the capital of Vienna. Long-distance (high-
speed) lines connect the capital to other major cities in Austria, as well as to other European cities. Austria's central location in Europe
means that there are many cross-border connections to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Germany and
Switzerland. Much of the freight traﬃc between Germany and Italy passes through the Tirol region. ÖBB-Personenverkehr is the
largest train operating company. It operates an average of 4000 train runs per day, with a total of 10.28 billion passenger kilometres
per year. Some smaller TOCs also operate cross-border connections as well as regional, and intercity services. Both ÖBB-Infrastruktur
and ÖBB-personenverkehr belong to ÖBB-Holding AG, which is owned entirely by the Republic of Austria.
4.2.2. Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Railway traﬃc on the main rail lines is monitored from ﬁve regional traﬃc control centres (Betriebsfühhrungszentralen, BFZ).
Traﬃc management is carried out by a regional traﬃc controller or Zuglenker. Rail traﬃc operations are mainly automated using the
ARAMIS traﬃc management system, which makes it possible to track train positions and potential conﬂicts in real-time. In such
cases, the system generates operational solutions. Moreover, routes (switches and signals) are automatically set, and passenger
information is automatically adjusted. However, not all rail lines can be fully controlled from the BFZ and are managed from signal
boxes located at stations. Hence, while signallers (Fahrdienstleiter-Stellbereich) in the BFZ are solely tasked with monitoring the safe
allocation of rail capacity, signallers at the stations still operate switches and signals by order of the Zuglenker. ÖBB-Infrastruktur is
also tasked with shunting operations. Consequently, signallers are quite busy with monitoring these operations. Each BFZ has an
Table 3
Description of the diﬀerent roles.
Role Description
Signaller An operator who is responsible for the safe allocation of rail capacity through the control of rail switches and
signals. This operator implements rescheduling decisions made by the regional traﬃc controller.
Train Dispatcher An operator who is responsible for the safe allocation of rail capacity through the control of rail switches and
signals. This operator is allowed to reschedule the traﬃc plan for its own small area of control.
Regional Traﬃc Controller Is responsible for the optimization of rail traﬃc ﬂows in a speciﬁc geographical area.
Network Traﬃc Controller Oversees railway traﬃc at a national level
Network Operations Controller Manages train operations for the main TOC at a national level
Team leader/Duty Oﬃcer/Shift Leader/Team
Supervisor
Oversees the work of a group of operators in a control centre and communicates with other control centres
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operations coordinator (Betriebskoordinator, Beko), who is the central operational actor. He or she communicates with the TOCs,
neighbouring regional traﬃc control centres at home and abroad, and the national traﬃc control centre in Vienna. During a local
disruption, the Beko will decide on a contingency plan and monitor the workload of all employees. An emergency coordinator
(Notfallkoordinator or Noko) communicates with the emergency services and manages all emergencies in a speciﬁc system (REM),
which can be accessed by all parties in the rail system.
The central control room in Vienna (Verkehrsleitzentrale Wien or VLZ) was established in 2006. ÖBB-Infrastruktur and
Personenverkehr are co-located in the VLZ. The VLZ has two operators of ÖBB-Infrastruktur who monitor the rail traﬃc on Austria's
north-south and east-west corridors. There is also an operator responsible for the management of all information during a crisis and a
network coordinator who communicates with the TOCs, both at home and abroad, and informs management. A team of operators
from ÖBB-Infrastruktur and Personenverkehr jointly manage both rolling stock and train crew for the whole of ÖBB-personenverkehr.
Operators from ÖBB-Personenverkehr monitor the connections between trains and update passenger information on the website.
4.3. Germany
4.3.1. National characteristics
Deutsche Bahn (DB) Netz AG manages 33,295 km of rail lines, the largest network in Europe. Due to Germany's central position in
Europe, 6 out of 9 European freight corridors run through this country. Subsequently, rail freight transport volumes are quite high.
The busiest sections are the corridors between the North Sea ports (Rotterdam/Antwerp) to the Alpine countries (Swiss, Austria, and
Italy), Frankfurt – Hamburg, and the Ruhr area to Berlin and further. DB Netz monitors about 45,000 train runs, consisting of
approximately 39,000 passenger trains and almost 5500 freight trains, on a daily basis. A total of 76.93 billion passenger kilometres
are travelled annually. DB Netz is one of the subsidiaries of Deutsche Bahn AG, others being DB Fernverkehr (long distance traﬃc),
DB Regio (local and regional traﬃc), and DB Cargo. DB Fernverkehr is the almost-exclusive provider of long-distance passenger
services. While there is far more competition on the regional and the cargo rail market in particular, DB Regio and Cargo still
dominate both markets. Still, there are almost 400 TOCs operating on the German rail network, 360 of which are not part of the DB
holding.
4.3.2. Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Railway traﬃc is managed from seven regional control centres (Betriebszentrale, BZ). However, only a relatively small number of
the more than 12,000 signallers nationwide work in the BZs and use computers for setting switches and signals. There are still over
3400 operational signal boxes from which switches and signals are set: some even use manually operated mechanical levers. A BZ has
ten train dispatchers (Zugdisponent) on average, who monitor the traﬃc ﬂows on speciﬁc line sections and nodes. They manage
conﬂicts between trains with the help of predeﬁned dispatching rules. During a disruption, they take the ﬁrst measures to isolate the
disrupted area with the help of their traﬃc management system LeiDis-NK. They also take note of the reasons behind delays and
disruptions in the traﬃc management system.
In addition, there are two or three regional traﬃc controllers (Bereichsdisponent) who oversee the work of the Zugdisponenten
from a diﬀerent control room. The Bereichsdisponent manages requests and complaints from TOCs, for example regarding connecting
services. They also manage disruptions in consultation with the TOCs. The Netzkoordinator supervises all activities of the BZ. During
large-scale disruptions, the coordinator communicates with the TOCs and neighbouring control centres. He or she also has the ﬁnal
say if there is a conﬂict of interest, or resources of the TOCs might be needed to solve the disruption. An emergency manager
(Notfallmanager) manages incidents and communicates with the emergency services.
In 1997, a national control room (Netleitzentrale or NLZ) was established in Frankfurt am Main. Here, three to four operators
(Bereichskoordinator) monitor long-distance and international rail traﬃc along the main corridors. Each Bereichskoordinator is re-
sponsible for two or more BZs. Together they monitor around 800 passenger trains and 1200 freight trains per day. In addition, they
coordinate with the traﬃc control in neighbouring countries. The NLZ also has a coordinator (Netzkoordinator). The Netzkoordinator
mainly has a supervisory role during extreme disruptions and severe weather conditions. The coordinator in the NLZ has the ﬁnal say
in the event of a disagreement between actors on a national level. During normal operations the Netzkoordinator is mainly occupied
with monitoring the entire rail network and writing daily reports for senior management.
4.4. The Netherlands
4.4.1. National characteristics
The Dutch railway network measures more than 3000 km in length, often with double or quadruple tracks, and is mostly elec-
triﬁed. The network is dense around the four largest cities in the west of the country (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and
Utrecht), with Utrecht being the most important node in the railway network. The main network is exclusively served by Dutch
Railways (Nederlandse Spoorwegen or NS). Some regional or secondary lines are operated by various smaller TOCs. The Dutch rail
network is one of the busiest rail networks in Europe (per kilometre of rail track), with almost 5500 passenger train runs per day and a
total of 15.31 billion passenger kilometres annually. There is also considerable freight traﬃc between Germany, Belgium and the
ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The network is managed by the state-owned RIM ProRail.
4.4.2. Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Rail traﬃc is managed from 13 regional traﬃc control centres (Verkeersleidingspost). Each centre has one or two regional traﬃc
D. Schipper, L. Gerrits Journal of Rail Transport Planning & Management xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
8
controllers (Decentale verkeersleider, DVL) who optimize the traﬃc ﬂows in their control area and process orders from the TOCs. There
are also several train dispatchers (Treindienstleiders, TDL), whose main responsibility is the safe allocation of rail capacity on speciﬁc
sections (nodes) assigned to them. All switches and signals are operated using computer-based control. In addition, train dispatchers
reschedule the rail traﬃc in their own control areas (mostly around large stations). The latter task is delegated to the DVL. A team
leader monitors the crew's workload. NS also has ﬁve regional control centres (Regionale Bijsturingscentra) to manage its train crew
and rolling stock. These control centres more of less mirror those of ProRail. This means that there are two operators to monitor
traﬃc ﬂows (they communicate with the DVL), node coordinators to arrange the shunting of trains and manage train crew at the
major train stations (they communicate with the train dispatcher), and a shift leader (who communicates with the team leader).
There are also several operators tasked with the management of rolling stock and train crew.
The central Operational Control Centre Rail (OCCR) was established in 2010. The OCCR houses all parties involved in the rail
operations under one roof to improve collaboration and communication. Consequently, a wide range of specialized teams can be
found in the OCCR, including ICT, asset management, maintenance contractors, and a freight operator. All TOCs have been invited to
take up workstations, but NS is the only passenger TOC active in the OCCR. Back-oﬃce functions have also been centralized. Back-
oﬃce employees collect all information on disruptions and malfunctions in a speciﬁc system, alarm emergency services and con-
tractors, and provide updates on the management of the disruptions. Each team in the OCCR is represented by a director (regisseur).
These directors meet at the beginning and end of every shift at meetings chaired by a coordinator (Landelijk Coordinator Rail). During
a major disruption the directors will often come together to provide each other with updates and to make joint decisions.
Operators of ProRail's traﬃc management and NS's operations management in the OCCR monitor rail traﬃc on a national level
and coordinate the activities of the regional control centres. Two operators from ProRail monitor the rail traﬃc on the main corridors
and communicate with the regional traﬃc controllers (DVL). The director of the national traﬃc control communicates directly with
the team leaders of the regional control centres. Their NS counterparts monitor the traﬃc and rolling stock on a national level to
optimize punctuality and the distribution of rolling stock over the regions.
4.5. Belgium
4.5.1. National characteristics
The Belgian network measures around 3600 km. Most of the network is electriﬁed and around two-thirds feature double or more
tracks. The network is particularly dense in the Flemish part of the country, marked by the cities of Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent and
Leuven. Brussels forms an important, but fragile, node in the north-south and east-west corridors. The infrastructure is managed by
the state-owned autonomous company Infrabel. In 2014 Infrabel was separated from the sole provider of passenger services, the state-
owned autonomous company NMBS (or SNBC in French). There is more competition in the freight sector, with around 11 freight
operating companies. NMBS operates around 4160 train runs per day, which adds up to a total of 10.4 billion kilometres per year.
4.5.2. Structure and relationships between roles and teams
Belgium has around 91 signal boxes. This number has been reduced signiﬁcantly over the years with the introduction of new
traﬃc control systems, which should result in centralizing of control to initially 31 and later 10 regional control centres. Operators in
the signal boxes monitor rail traﬃc at three diﬀerent control levels. At the lowest level signallers (operatoren) operate the switches
and signals and set the route of a train. The next rung in the hierarchy is occupied by the traﬃc controllers (toezichtbedienden) who
monitor the work of the signallers and are responsible for the safe allocation of rail capacity. At the highest level, there is one operator
(regelaar), who is in charge of the entire team and operations in the area monitored by the local control centre. The speciﬁc task of the
local control centres is the safe allocation of rail capacity.
Rail traﬃc management is conducted by operators in the national control centre (Railway Operations Centre or ROC). They decide
on the rescheduling of trains in the event of delays, disturbances or disruptions. The local control centres have to implement these
decisions. In the ROC Infrabel and NMBS work very closely together. The country has been divided into four regions, each of which
has been assigned a team, composed of operators from Infrabel and NMBS who manage the rail traﬃc. Belgium has a language divide
between the Dutch and the French speaking regions. Consequently, the ROC has been divided in French and Dutch speaking teams,
even though operators are supposed to speak both languages. The high-speed lines to France, Germany and the Netherlands are
managed by a separate team. The regions themselves are also subdivided into two or three sections containing several rail lines.
Regional traﬃc controllers of Infrabel (Lijnregelaars) monitor the rail traﬃc on one or more rail lines. To manage the rail traﬃc, the
regional traﬃc controllers need to be in close contact with the local control centres. Interestingly however, the Lijnregelaars can also
directly communicate with train drivers and even place an emergency call. This makes it possible for the Lijnregelaars to immediately
intervene in the rail traﬃc. Besides the regional traﬃc controllers, there are two operators of NMBS, in each team, who monitor their
own passenger trains.
With NMBS and Infrabel operators being part of one co-located team it is very easy for them to discuss matters face-to-face.
Although there is a lot of ﬂexibility within the teams in terms of roles and providing each other with back-up, interaction between the
teams appears limited. Each team clearly functions as a separate entity, supervised by a team leader from both Infrabel and NMBS. A
Traﬃc Oﬃcer and General Supervisor coordinate the activities of the four teams and monitor their workload. During normal op-
erations they are responsible for collecting information on regular delays and writing management reports. Positioned in the middle
of the control room are NMBS operators, who manage all the rolling stock and train crew and provide technical support to the train
drivers. Overall, much communication is conducted by phone. An advanced notiﬁcation system is currently being developed to
reduce oral communication.
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5. Similarities and diﬀerences between disruption management practices
Having discussed team roles and responsibilities, we will now turn our attention to actual disruption management practices. The
two trade-oﬀs identiﬁed in the introduction are used to characterize and categorize the countries: centralization versus decen-
tralization, and anticipation versus resilience. The items from Table 1 structure the observations.
5.1. Rail traﬃc control: centralized or decentralized?
5.1.1. Distribution of control centres
The overview in Section 4 revealed some major diﬀerences in the centralization of traﬃc control. Although all rail systems show
an increased automatization and centralization of traﬃc control, the Dutch railway system is the only one to have fully replaced its
signal boxes with modern regional control centres equipped with computerized control systems. In the other countries signalling is
still controlled using a mix of mechanical lever frames, control panels and computers. Hence, Austria, Belgium, and Germany feature
a decentralized network of signal boxes. The Dutch rail system is also an outlier with regard to the decentralized management of train
crew and rolling stock by the main TOC. In Denmark, Belgium, and Austria the main TOCs have mostly integrated these processes in
national control centres. In Germany there are numerous control centres from which the many diﬀerent TOCs manage their op-
erations. For instance, Deutsche Bahn has control rooms for local rail traﬃc (Transportleitung Personenverkehrs) and long-distance
traﬃc (Verkehrsleitung Fernverkehr). Not all of these control rooms have been integrated in the Betriebszentrale of DB Netz.
5.1.2. Decision making during a disruption
In the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium decision-making during a disruption is done in the national control centres. Hence, no
matter what impact a disruption has, the national control centre will decide on an alternative service plan. In Belgium and Denmark
this alternative service plan is mostly the result of joint decision-making by the TOC and IM, whereas in Belgium, decisions are made
within each of the four teams. In the Netherlands consultation between the RIM and TOC is also important, but the TOC will decide
on the alternative service plan within the boundaries set by the RIM. In Germany, decision making is decentralized, with the
Betriebszentralen making most decisions on rescheduling rail traﬃc. The Netzleitzentrale's role is to coordinate the decisions made by
the diﬀerent Betriebszentralen with regard to long-distance traﬃc. As such, their involvement in the management of a disruption
depends on the situation but is usually restrained. The authority to make decisions during disruptions in Austria is divided between
local traﬃc (BFZ) and long-distance traﬃc (Verkehrsleitzentrale). The BFZ manages the disruptions in their own region, in consultation
with the TOCs, and only has to consult with the Verkehrsleitzentrale over long-distance traﬃc.
5.1.3. Autonomy of local control centres
There are also diﬀerences regarding the distribution of authority and the division of responsibilities between the diﬀerent layers
of control In Belgium signal boxes are speciﬁcally there to guarantee safe allocation of rail capacity. Decisions on rescheduling rail
traﬃc are exclusively made by the operators in the ROC. This strict separation of responsibilities between both layers of control seems
to work quite well and the hierarchical structure appeared undisputed. In the Netherlands and Denmark local traﬃc controllers are
tasked with the optimization of rail traﬃc in their own area of control, while national operators monitor rail traﬃc on the main
corridors. However, consultation with the national operators is mandatory if rescheduling decisions taken by the regional traﬃc
controllers aﬀect multiple regions. In the Netherlands we noticed that it isn't always clear to operators at what point a local issue
becomes a super-regional problem, resulting in ambiguity concerning when and how national operators should intervene in local
operations (cf. Schipper, 2017).
The Austrians also used to experience a diﬀuse separation of roles and responsibilities between local and national control centres,
which often led to conﬂicts between the BFZ and the VLZ. Subsequently, the VLZ was made solely responsible for the management of
long-distance and international services. The BFZ have to consult with the VLZ when rescheduling long-distance trains. The BZ in
Germany have considerable autonomy within their own region. The NLZ monitors the actions of the BZ and only intervenes during
major disruptions, when long-distance traﬃc in multiple regions is aﬀected. In practice, we observed that intuition also plays an
important role in Germany with regard to the decision to intervene in local operations and therefore there are no strict boundaries.
5.1.4. Co-location of RIM and TOCs
The extent of competition and, subsequently, the unbundling of infrastructure management and rail operations varies sig-
niﬁcantly between the countries. The Netherlands, Denmark, and recently Belgium implemented a more or less complete unbundling
of infrastructure management and train service operations, while this is less the case in Germany and Austria, where the RIM and the
main TOC are part of the same holding. However, there is far more competition on the German rail network than in the other
countries. The fragmentation of train operating services has an important inﬂuence on the relationship between the RIM and TOCs in
the disruption management process. In Germany we found that although some TOCs (mostly regional branches of DB) are co-located
in the BZs, most of them have opted to use their own control centres. In the other countries, where there is less competition even
though legal unbundling is more predominant, we still see a very strong relationship between the RIM and the historically dominant
TOC. In all these countries the RIM and TOC are co-located in the national control centre. Integration is strongest in Belgium where
the teams consist of operators from both Infrabel and NMBS. Here, co-location facilitates joint decision-making through face-to-face
communication. In Germany we noticed a stricter separation between the processes of DB Netz and the TOC's. Standardized text
messages are sent via e-mail or text message (Strecken.info) in order to quickly notify all TOCs of a disruption (planned and
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unplanned) so that they can adjust their operations. TOCs can also make use of DB Netz's traﬃc management system, which gives
them a real-time overview of their own trains and potential delays. However, they are unable to monitor services operated by other
TOCs because DB Netz wants to avoid potential discussions about unfair treatment.
5.1.5. Communication structure
The communication structure of the diﬀerent countries can be traced in Figs. 1–5. The distinct structure of the Dutch system
stands out because of its density. In the Netherlands, both the RIM and the main TOC have several local control centres that interact
directly with each other. Moreover, there are also many direct connections between operators in these diﬀerent control centres. This
has produced a denser and more complex communication network in contrast to the other countries. Although a dense network
facilitates the swift dissemination of information, it also means less control over information ﬂows and more coordination costs
(Schipper et al., 2015). In the other countries we noticed a much more centralized communication structure in which team leaders
communicated with the national control centres, and vice versa. Of course, the co-location of the RIM and main TOC in Belgium,
Denmark, and Austria also greatly reduces the communication burden. In Germany, communication with the numerous TOCs forms a
major challenge. In all of the countries except Belgium, ICT facilitates the distribution of information to the TOCs and national control
centres. For instance, the traﬃc controllers in the VLZ receive most information about disruptions from the traﬃc management
system and the railway emergency management system. On the basis of this information they decide whether to intervene in the long-
distance traﬃc or to leave the management of the disruption to the BFZ. This is less of an issue in Belgium because the ROC performs
a somewhat diﬀerent role than national control centres elsewhere.
5.2. Disruption management: anticipation or resilience?
5.2.1. The use of contingency plans
The Dutch railway system relies strongly on predeﬁned contingency plans (Versperringsmaatregel). Numerous alternative service
plans have been developed by ProRail and NS for almost all kinds of disruptions, on all lines. A quick implementation of a con-
tingency plan should prevent a propagation of the disruption and facilitate coordination between the diﬀerent control centres.
Accordingly, trains are not rerouted, with the exception of international and cargo trains. Instead, passengers are advised to use an
alternative route or alternative transport (busses). This reliance on contingency plans is not without its diﬃculties. In practice,
deﬁning, checking, and implementing a contingency plan requires considerable communication between the diﬀerent control cen-
tres. In addition, small deviations or changes in the operational environment might make these static plans infeasible, which in
practice necessitates a real-time adjustment of plans. In Austria contingency plans have been developed for the most common
disruptions. Although these contingency plans are detailed and numerous, they mainly serve as a template for the operators
managing the disruption. Hence, on-the-spot decision making is still dominant and the ﬁnal solution depends on the speciﬁc cir-
cumstances. In other words, there appears to be more operational ﬂexibility in Austria than in the Netherlands.
In the other countries we noticed that the use of contingency plans is much less common or almost non-existent. For example, in
Denmark there are around 30 predeﬁned contingency plans, but these plans are often revised. During disruptions, operators of
Banedanmark and DSB gather in an emergency room in the DCDK to decide on an alternative plan on-the-spot. This makes the
disruption management process in Denmark more ﬂexible, but also very dependent on the team of operators in charge. We also
observed that most of these ad-hoc plans are not recorded for later use, so the solution is often lost after the disruption is solved.
Another issue concerns the fact that both parties have to reach consensus in the heat of the moment. Similarly, in Belgium operators
stressed the unique characteristics of every disruption and therefore the need for improvisation. During our observations we were
struck by the ﬂuidity of the teams and the amount of implicit coordination, i.e. their actions seemed coordinated despite relatively
limited communication and the absence of a predeﬁned plan. In Germany contingency plans have been developed with the TOCs for
the main lines, but not for the entire network. These plans also mainly serve as a template. For instance, it is a common practice to
reroute long-distance trains during disruptions, which is something the large and dense network allows for (many stations can be
reached through various routes). These alternative routes are not part of a predeﬁned plan, but the operators rely on their extensive
knowledge of the rail network and creativity to reroute trains in consultation with the TOCs.
5.2.2. Automation of operations
The countries in this study show a mix of automation and manual routing. For example, while the Netherlands is the only country
with full computer based control and automatic route setting, regional traﬃc controllers have to rely on their experience to detect
conﬂicts between trains and to ﬁnd solutions. Nevertheless, while some countries still partly rely on mechanic lever frames, we
noticed that all the countries are working on automation and centralizing their traﬃc control. For example, Denmark is the ﬁrst
European country planning to deploy ERTMS 2 for both train-track communication and the back oﬃce. The new signalling should
make it possible to manage rail traﬃc from two control centres. Similarly, Austria is fully replacing older technologies for computer-
based signalling and traﬃc control on its main lines. ÖBB's Aramis traﬃc management system features automatic route setting,
conﬂict detection, and decision support during rescheduling. Similarly, Infrabel and DB Netz have bought the Swiss Rail Control
System to manage its rail traﬃc. This system oﬀers conﬂict detection and simulates possible solutions. Such systems have a huge
impact on traﬃc management as work routinely performed by operators becomes automated, making it possible for operators to
monitor larger areas and reducing the number of operators needed. Moreover, these systems also support operators to act more
proactive and let them focus on solving disruptions. There are however also risks associated with automation. Modern traﬃc
management systems often feature more possibilities than human operators can comprehend. In addition, operators may become
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ﬁxated by computer screens and lose the detailed knowledge and experience of the traﬃc management processes that comes through
manual control.
5.2.3. Institutionalization of shared sensemaking
A coordinated response to a disruption requires the exchange of appropriate information between the diﬀerent control centres.
However, simply sharing information is not enough to create this shared understanding. Operators need to combine their expertise
and collectively make sense of the information. In the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Austria shared sensemaking is facilitated
in the form of special crisis rooms in the national control centres where the operators of the RIM and TOC gather to discuss the
situation and make joint decisions. In Denmark this is done during every disruption, while the crisis rooms in the Netherlands,
Germany, and Austria are only used during severe disruptions, like those caused by extreme weather conditions. In the Netherlands
we also often observed that operators of ProRail and Dutch Railways would arrange ad-hoc meetings at a cabinet in the control room.
In Belgium face-to-face communication between the RIM and TOC is straightforward because operators cooperate in teams.
Nevertheless, we observed that operators often didn't take a time-out to discuss ongoing activities and plans in a quick meeting. Most,
if not all, discussions took place on the work ﬂoor. In Germany, face-to-face meetings between RIM and TOCs is extremely diﬃcult
because of the size and complexity of the network and the many TOCs working from diﬀerent locations. Information exchanges have
therefore become more and more standardized and shared sensemaking has to be done by phone. In all countries, shared sensemaking
between national and regional control centres remains diﬃcult due to the physical distances, as well as time lag and only incomplete
information being available at various locations.
5.2.4. Dispatching rules
In Germany, rail traﬃc management is guided by predeﬁned goals and rules. In the event of a disruption DB Netz's dispatching
guidelines prescribe a maximum usage of the remaining capacity, the need to improve joint punctuality of all trains, and the task of
quickly rescheduling in order to operate according to an alternative plan. This rescheduling is done on the basis of dispatching rules that
give priority to emergency vehicles, trains with express routes, and fast-speed over slow-speed trains. TOCs can purchase an express
(priority) status for their passenger and cargo trains to assure a swift and direct journey during disruptions. The dispatching rules should
secure non-discriminatory access to the German rail network and provide a framework for the dispatchers. However, one of the issues
with the use of dispatching rules is that delayed express or fast-speed trains will overtake slower but punctual trains. This can severely
disrupt local rail traﬃc. A similar dispatching rule is in use in Austria. It prioritizes long-distance trains over all other trains (apart from
emergency vehicles) to assure conﬂict-free management of rail traﬃc by the BFZ. It is, however, possible for the BFZ to deviate from
these rules if this beneﬁts local traﬃc ﬂows, but only in consultation with the traﬃc controllers in the VLZ. For instance, the third
dispatching rule dictates that punctual trains (−5 to +10 min) should remain punctual. In practice, we observed that in both instances
there is quite some pressure to prioritize long-distance and express trains, even if that means delaying local traﬃc.
In the Netherlands, train dispatchers have a document with dispatching rules (Trein Afhandelings Document or TAD) for the most
common situations, which have been developed jointly with NS. TADs tell the train dispatcher how long a train can wait for a
connecting train and where to short-turn a train. They also provide resolution rules if there is a conﬂict between trains. However, not
every conﬂict situation is covered in the TAD. Consequently, train dispatching still relies heavily on the skill and experience of the
train dispatchers to decide on the right order. ProRail doesn't make a distinction between trains, but trains running on time are given
priority over delayed trains. The same goes for Denmark, where Banedanmark decides on the priority of trains and experience plays
an important role in the decision on the order of priority. Finally, in Belgium a total of ﬁfteen dispatching rules give fast-speed trains
priority over slow trains, international or intercity services priority over local traﬃc, and most passenger services priority over freight
traﬃc. However, operators are allowed to deviate from these rules if doing so would help to swiftly restore services. During our
observations, a bomb threat at Brussels North had blocked all traﬃc in the Brussels region. We observed how international trains
were the ﬁrst to be dispatched, followed by regional and local trains. The order of dispatching local trains, however, seemed to be
based on pragmatism.
6. Synthesis
The previous section described the practices of disruption management in the countries studied with regard to the two main trade-
oﬀs. As a ﬁnal step, we will show how the countries dealt with the trade-oﬀs. To this end, we assigned scores to each item on a scale
from 1 (strongly centralized; reliance on anticipation) to 5 (strongly decentralized; reliance on resilience) on the basis of the data. The
resulting scores are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 demonstrates that while countries can diﬀer signiﬁcantly on individual items, they can also show quite some similarities
in how they deal with both trade-oﬀs. This is an expression of the trade-oﬀs: there is no one best solution. Institutions, existing
routines on the basis of ‘how things are done here’, the relationship between RIM and TOCs, and the ongoing introduction of new
technologies mean that the trade-oﬀs are made in a certain direction, while not necessarily providing the ‘best’ way of doing things.
This, of course, is the nature of a trade-oﬀ.
Fig. 6 visualizes how the ﬁve countries relate to each other with regard to the trade-oﬀs. Note that this ﬁgure is purely illustrative
and does not imply precise measurement. Two clusters can be discerned. First of all, Austria and the Netherlands are both moderately
centralized and of the ﬁve countries, they rely the most on a formalized approach to dealing with disruptions. As has been mentioned
before, while formalization reduces the coordination burden and produces more predictable outcomes, it may also reduce a system's
ability to adapt to unanticipated events. Belgium and Denmark form the second cluster as they are relatively similar. Belgium and
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especially Denmark combine a centralized structure with an emphasis on resilience. Indeed, operators seemed to enjoy more ﬂex-
ibility in the management of disruptions as compared to the Netherlands. Germany appears a bit of an outlier. It is much more
decentralized than the other countries. This is very likely to be an expression of the size and complexity of the network along with the
large number of TOCs as this reduces the possibilities for centralized control.
7. Conclusions
We described and categorized disruption management structures and practices in Belgium, Germany, Austria, Denmark and the
Netherlands. On the basis of interviews and observations, we showed the various ways in which these countries deal with the main
trade-oﬀs between centralization & decentralization, and between anticipation & resilience. We then related the countries on the
basis of these two trade-oﬀs. We found clusters of countries, which suggests that diﬀerences on individual items can still lead to an
overall similarity. Austria and the Netherlands can be characterized as moderately centralized and relying on an anticipatory ap-
proach, while Belgium and Denmark are more centralized and put more emphasis on resilience, i.e. the freedom to rely on the
operator's ingenuity to solve disruptions. Germany proved to be far more decentralized than the other countries, which seems to be in
line with the size and complexity of its system.
This research, with its focus on everyday practices in international perspective, is a ﬁrst. Naturally, more research would be
welcome. The sample could be extended and there is a clear need for a more empirical grounding of the items used. Nevertheless, we
Table 4
Scores per country (all individual items were given equal weight; the aggregated scores are averages).
Item Countries
Austria Belgium Denmark Germany Netherlands
Centralized or decentralized
Distribution of control centres 3 5 1 4 2
Allocation of decision rights during disruption 3 2 1 4 1
Autonomy of local control centres 3 1 4 5 4
Structure and lines of communication 2 3 1 4 5
Co-location of RIM and TOCs 2 1 2 5 2
Average score 2.6 2.4 1.8 4.4 2.8
Anticipation or resilience
Role of contingency plans 2 5 4 3 1
Automation of control 1 4 2 3 2
Institutionalization of shared sensemaking 2 3 1 3 1
Use of dispatching rules 2 2 5 1 3
Average score 1.75 3.75 3 2.50 1.75
Fig. 6. Visualization of how countries perform on both trade-oﬀs.
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think that the current results could help rail infrastructure managers and train operating companies to reﬂect on their own practices
and to learn from others. A goal, still far away, would be to relate the trade-oﬀs to performance and resilience of the systems. This
goal requires considerable caution. Both the complexities of the systems and their mutual diﬀerences are so immense that making a
straightforward link to performance would require a leap of faith. A focus on practices is in itself complex because it takes a good
command of several languages and a great deal of time before one starts to understand what operators do and how this diﬀers from
country to country. Nonetheless, this should be an important strand of research.
Acknowledgements
We would like thank all rail infrastructure managers and train operating companies for their hospitality and unrestricted access to
all operations. In addition, we would like to thank ProRail and NWO (grant number 438-12-308) for funding this research and
Emanuel Wenzel for translation duties during the site visits in Austria and Germany.
References
Berthod, O., Grothe-Hammer, M., Müller-Seitz, G., Raab, J., Sydow, J., 2017. From high-reliability organizations to high-reliability networks: the dynamics of network
governance in the face of emergency. J. Publ. Adm. Res. Theor. 27 (2), 352–371.
Boin, A., van Eeten, M.J., 2013. The resilient organization. Publ. Manag. Rev. 15 (3), 429–445.
Branlat, M., Woods, D.D., 2010. How do systems manage their adaptive capacity to successfully handle disruptions? a resilience engineering perspective. In: 2010
AAAI Fall Symposium Series.
Chu, F., Oetting, A., 2013. Modeling capacity consumption considering disruption program characteristics and the transition phase to steady operations during
disruptions. J. Rail Transport Plann. Manag. 3 (3), 54–67.
Comfort, L.K., Sungu, Y., Johnson, D., Dunn, M., 2001. Complex systems in crisis: anticipation and resilience in dynamic environments. J. Contingencies Crisis Manag.
9 (3), 144–158.
Corman, F., D'Ariano, A., Hansen, I.A., Pacciarelli, D., 2011. Optimal multi-class rescheduling of railway traﬃc. J. Rail Transport Plann. Manag. 1 (1), 14–24.
De Bruijne, M., Van Eeten, M., 2007. Systems that should have failed: critical infrastructure protection in an institutionally fragmented environment. J. Contingencies
Crisis Manag. 15 (1), 18–29.
De Bruijne, M., 2006. Networked Reliability: Institutional Fragmentation and the Reliability of Service Provision in Critical Infrastructures (PhD). .
Faraj, S., Xiao, Y., 2006. Coordination in fast-response organizations. Manag. Sci. 52 (8), 1155–1169.
Golightly, D., Sandblad, B., Dadashi, N., Andersson, A., Tschirner, S., Sharples, S., 2013. A sociotechnical comparison of automated train traﬃc control between GB
and Sweden. Rail Human Factors: Supporting Reliability, Safety and Cost Reduction. pp. 367.
Golightly, D., Dadashi, N., 2017. The characteristics of railway service disruption: implications for disruption management. Ergonomics 60 (3), 307–320.
Goodwin, G.F., Essens, P.J.M.D., Smith, D., 2012. Multiteam systems in the public sector. In: Zaccaro, S.J., Marks, M.A., DeChurch, L.A. (Eds.), Multiteam Systems: an
Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Routledge, New York, pp. 53–78.
Hémond, Y., Robert, B., 2012. Preparedness: the state of the art and future prospects. Disaster Prev. Manag.: Int. J. 21 (4), 404–417.
Hoﬀman, R., Woods, D., 2011. Beyond Simon’s slice: ﬁve fundamental trade-oﬀs that bound the performance of macrocognitive work systems. IEEE Intell. Syst. 26 (6),
67–71.
Houghton, R.J., Baber, C., McMaster, R., Stanton, N.A., Salmon, P., Stewart, R., Walker, G., 2006. Command and control in emergency services operations: a social
network analysis. Ergonomics 49 (12–13), 1204–1225.
Jespersen-Groth, J., Potthoﬀ, D., Clausen, J., Huisman, D., Kroon, L., Maróti, G., Nielsen, M.N., 2009. Disruption Management in Passenger Railway Transportation.
Robust and Online Large-scale Optimization. Springer, pp. 399–421.
Johansson, B., Hollnagel, E., 2007. Pre-requisites for large scale coordination. Cognit. Technol. Work 9 (1), 5–13.
Link, H., 2012. Unbundling, public infrastructure ﬁnancing and access charge regulation in the German rail sector. J. Rail Transport Plann. Manag. 2 (3), 63–71.
Mattsson, L., Jenelius, E., 2015. Vulnerability and resilience of transport systems–a discussion of recent research. Transport. Res. Part A Pol. Pract. 81, 16–34.
McManus, S.T., 2008. Organisational Resilience in New Zealand. PhD-thesis. University of Canterbury.
Merkus, D., Willems, T.A.H., Schipper, D., Marrewijk, A.H. van, Koppenjan, J.F.M., Veenswijk, M., Bakker, H.L.M., 2016. A storm is coming? Collective sensemaking
and ambiguity in an inter-organizational team managing railway system disruptions. J. Change Manag. 17 (3), 228–248.
Perrow, C., 1999. Organizing to reduce the vulnerabilities of complexity. J. Contingencies Crisis Manag. 7 (3), 150–155.
Roe, E., Schulman, P., 2008. High Reliability Management. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
Roets, B., Christiaens, J., 2015. Evaluation of railway traﬃc control eﬃciency and its determinants. EJTIR 15 (4), 396–418.
Schipper, D., 2017. Challenges to multiteam system leadership: an analysis of leadership during the management of railway disruptions. Cognit. Technol. Work 19 (2-
3), 445–459.
Schipper, D., Gerrits, L., 2017. Communication and Sensemaking in the Dutch Railway System: Explaining coordination failure between teams using a mixed methods
approach. Complex. Govern. Network 3 (2), 31–53.
Schipper, D., Gerrits, L., Koppenjan, J.F.M., 2015. A dynamic network analysis of the information ﬂows during the management of a railway disruption. Eur. J.
Transport Infrastruct. Res. 15 (4), 442–464.
Stanton, N.A., Ashleigh, M.J., Roberts, A.D., Xu, F., 2001. Testing hollnagel's contextual control model: assessing team behavior in a human supervisory control task.
Int. J. Cognit. Ergon. 5 (2), 111–123.
Stanton, N.A., Walker, G.H., Sorensen, L.J., 2012. It's a small world after all: contrasting hierarchical and edge networks in a simulated intelligence analysis task.
Ergonomics 55 (3), 265–281.
Steenhuisen, B., De Bruijne, M., 2009. The brittleness of unbundled train systems: crumbling operational coping strategies. In: 2nd International Symposium on
Engineering Systems. MIT, Cambridge, USA 15-17 June 2009.
Stephenson, A.V., 2010. Benchmarking the Resilience of Organisations. PhD-thesis. University of Canterbury.
Vogus, T.J., Sutcliﬀe, K.M., 2007. Organizational resilience: towards a theory and research agenda. In: Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2007. ISIC. IEEE International
Conference on, pp. 3418–3422.
Waller, M.J., Uitdewilligen, S., 2008. Talking to the room. collective sensemaking during crisis situations. In: Roe, R., Waller, M.J., Clegg, S. (Eds.), Time in
Organizational Research: Approaches and Methods. Routledge, London, pp. 186–203.
Wildavsky, A.B., 1988. Searching for Safety. Transaction publishers, New Brunswick.
Wilson, J.R., Norris, B.J., 2006. Human factors in support of a successful railway: a review. Cognit. Technol. Work 8 (1), 4–14.
Woods, D.D., Branlat, M., 2011. How human adaptive systems balance fundamental tradeoﬀs: implications for polycentric governance architectures. In: Proceedings of
the Fourth Resilience Engineering Symposium, Sophia Antipolis, France.
Woods, D.D., Shattuck, L.G., 2000. Distant supervision–local action given the potential for surprise. Cognit. Technol. Work 2 (4), 242–245.
Zhang, Y., Lei, D., Wang, M., Zeng, Q., 2013. Dispatching rules: track utilization scheduling problem in railway passenger stations. ICTIS 2013: Improving Multimodal
Transportation Systems-Information, Safety, and Integration. pp. 1857–1869.
D. Schipper, L. Gerrits Journal of Rail Transport Planning & Management xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
14
